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Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis:
The Experience of the French Civil Code
Olivier Moriteaut
I. Introduction: The Civil Code as a Straight-Jacket?
Since 1789, which marked the year of the French Revolution,
France has known no fewer than thirteen constitutions.' This fact is
scarcely evidence of political stability, although it is fair to say that the
Constitution of 1958, of the Fifth Republic, has remained in force for
over thirty-five years. On the other hand, the Civil Code (Code),
which came into force in 1804, has remained substantially unchanged
throughout this entire period. It has been amended many times, espe-
cially since the last war, to take into account the equality of women and
to modernize the law of divorce. However, many of its nearly 2,300
articles remain intact. Small wonder that it is sometimes referred to as
"the Civil Constitution"2
-legal stability exists where political stability
has been. lacking.
Lawyers in common law countries tend to consider the codified
civil law systems as restrictive and mechanical. The Code is seen as a
constraint, with judges obligated to make a mechanical application of
its provisions whenever a case arises which corresponds to the situation
described in the Code. Under such a conception, the court is seen as
"a sort of judicial slot machine."3
t Maitre de conferences (Associate Professor), Facult6 de droit, Universit Jean Mou-
lin, Lyon 3, France; Associate Director, Institut de droit compar6 Edouard Lambert; Visiting
Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, fall 1992, and Boston University School of
Law, fall 1993 and 1994; Visiting Fellow, Kingston University. Doctorat d'Etat de droit,
Universit6Jean Moulin, Lyon 3, France. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the
Faculty at the University of North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill, on September 30,
1994. I am indebted to Professor David Gruning, Loyola University School of Law, New
Orleans, Louisiana, for his helpful comments, and to Stewart Newcombe, Barrister, Consult-
ant to Etude Chaine, notaries in Lyon, for his very precious contribution to the final version.
1 Six of the thirteen constitutions arose in the revolutionary period between Septem-
ber 3, 1791, and May 18, 1804, this last being the constitution whereunder Napoleon became
emperor. There have been four republican constitutions, two monarchial constitutions, and
one of January 14, 1852, whereunder Napoleon III became emperor.
2 PAUL DUBOUCHET, LA PENSEEJURIDIQUE AvAr ET APRks LE CODE CPIL 92 (1991).
3 See RoscoE POUND, THE SPIIUT OF THE COMMON LAw 170-71 (1921) ("As a critic has
put it, the theory of the codes in Continental Europe in the last century made of the court a
sort of judicial slot machine. The necessary machinery had been provided in advance by
legislation or by received legal principles and one had but to put it in the facts above and
take out the decision below. True, this critic says, the facts do not always fit the machinery,
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There is no doubt that this presumption is wrong for most codes
in civil law countries. Certainly, it is not correct as far as the French
Civil Code is concerned, as that Code does not contain many detailed
provisions. True, a certain number of rather precise articles exist, for
example in the chapters on property, but most provisions are phrased
in the form of general rules. Moreover, these rules are succinct and
well written. Stendhal, one of the greatest writers of the 19th century,
expressed a deep admiration for the elegance and conciseness of the
French Civil Code. 4 Consider the following example: "Any act by
which a person causes damage to another makes the person by whose
fault the damage occurred liable to make reparation of such damage."5
It is precisely in the law of tort that the difference in approach
between common law countries and the countries with codified sys-
tems is so apparent. In the former countries, the courts look at each
case and apply legal principles extracted from precedents which they
themselves have created. In the latter, the courts have to apply general
principles enunciated by the legislature to a particular set of facts. Par-
adoxically, although countries such as France claim to be the heirs of
Roman law, in fact in many ways the Roman lawyers used the case-by-
case pragmatic approach of the common lawyers. 6 Nowhere is this
more apparent than in the case of the Roman law of tort, a point
which will be developed later.
The general principles are by no means confined to the law of
tort. The following examples are typical of the generality of the rules
to be found in other parts of the Civil Code:
Agreements legally entered into have the force of law for those who
have made them. They can only be revoked by their mutual assent, or
for causes that the law would allow. They must be performed in good
faith.7
Duress exerted against a party obliged under a contract nullifies the
contract, even when exerted by a third party.8
Duress exists whenever a reasonable person may be influenced by the
the fear of exposing his person or property to a substantial and pres-
ent harm. The age, sex and condition of the person have to be taken
into account.
9
[The sale] is perfect as between the parties and property passes by law
and hence we may have to thump and joggle the machinery a bit in order to get anything
out. But even in extreme cases of this departure from the purely automatic, the decision is
attributed, not at all to the thumping and joggling process, but solely to the machine.").
4 When writing his famous novel, La Chartreuse de Parme, Stendhal used to read a few
provisions every day in order to perfect his style. JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, 1
TRArrt DE DROIT CIVIL, IrNrrRonucnoN GtNtRALE 94 (2d ed. 1983) (citing letter from Sten-
dhal to Balzac (Oct. 30, 1840)). In the 20th century, Jules Romain, in his celebrated play,
Knock, also recommended reading the Civil Code in order to fight insomnia. Id.
5 CODE CIVIL [C. crv.] art. 1382 (Fr.).
6 See generally WILLIAM W. BUCK.AND & ARNOLD D. McNAMR, ROMAN LAw AND COMMON
LAw (1965).
7 C. civ. art. 1134 (Fr.).
8 C. crv. art. 1111 (Fr.).
9 C. civ. art. 1112 (Fr.).
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to the buyer as against the seller, as soon as they have agreed on the
thing and on the price, even if the thing has not been delivered or the
price has not been paid. 1 '
The preceding list is by no means exhaustive, and is merely illustrative
of the general couching of terms within the Code. Perusing the Civil
Code, it soon becomes apparent that judges have wide discretion in
interpreting its provisions. For example, in applying Article 1382 of
the Code,' the judge has to decide what the term "damage" means. Is
it limited to damage to the person or to property? Does it cover eco-
nomic loss or mental suffering? The task of defining these terms is left
to the courts. Similarly, Article 1111,12 relating to duress in contract,
gives no precise definition of duress. The courts will have to decide
whether such things as economic duress are covered by the code provi-
sion. The entire Code uses such general terms without giving a
definition.
The courts possess great freedom to interpret the Code as they
think fit. For instance, they can hold that the provisions of Article
1583,13 which states that property passes by law to the buyer at the time
of the contract, does not create a mandatory rule but rather only ap-
plies when parties have not otherwise stipulated.14 Unlike common
law courts, decisions by French courts do not create binding
precendents, although decisions of the Cour de cassation (the court of
highest jurisdiction) do have persuasive authority.' 5
Given the relative flexibility of judges to interpret the general
terms in the Code, how then could we get the idea that codes are
straight-jackets? Two reasons can be proposed. The first reason is
comparative. Traditionally, lawyers in America, England, and other
common law countries regard the law as being made by the courts.
When faced with a very precise, concrete question, the judge responds
by applying a particular rule, which may be distinguished in a subse-
quent case if the sitation in the latter case is slightly different. A legal
rule is therefore a precise rule. The legislative technique reflects this
conception. In common law countries, a statute has to deal with par-
ticular problems with detailed provisions, therefore leaving little room
for judicial interpretation. Therefore, many people in common law
jurisdictions tend to regard the law in a codified system as rigid, be-
cause they tend not to appreciate that the civil law legislature is con-
tent with enunciating general principles and are thereby necessarily
10 C. civ. art. 1583 (Fr.),
In C. civ. art. 1382 (Fr.). See supra text accompanying note 5.
12 C. crv. art. 1111 (Fr.). See supra text accompanying note 8.
13 C. crv. art. 1583 (Fr.). See supra text accompanying note 10.
14 Judgment of June 26, 1935, Cass. req., 1935 D.H. 414 (Fr.); Judgment of Jan. 24,
1984, Cass civ. Ire, 1984 Bull. Civ. I, No. 31 (Fr.).
15 RENt DAVID, FRENCH LAW, ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 179-86
(Michael Kindred trans., 1972).
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leaving a large margin for interpretation. 16
The second reason is political. Lawyers in civil law jurisdictions
traditionally insist that in a democracy, the law should be created by
the representatives of the people. This idea comes from Montes-
quieu's concept of separation of powers, 17 an idea which is the basis of
the American Constitution. In France, since the time of the French
Revolution, it has remained heretical to admit openly that judges can
be lawmakers or that they may have some normative power.
French lawyers certainly admit the existence of something which
may be described as case law. They call it 'jurisprudence."' 8 Any stu-
dent textbook or general introduction to the study of the law will ad-
mit that while some rules may be created by judges, the legislator is the
only direct lawmaker. 19 Jurisprudence (in the civil law sense of judge-
made law) is always described as an indirect source of law.
In France, more than in any other civil law country, this remains
the prevailing ideology. French lawyers worship what they call "posi-
tive law," the law created by the French legislator. Like Austinians,
they cannot dissociate the law from the authority of the State.20 The
legislator alone has authority to create the law. When the judge is re-
quired to fill a gap in the law, he has to find the support in the text of
the Code, and it should not be presumed that his ruling may be bind-
ing. The judge contributes to the law, but does not create it.
As always, one has to look back to history to understand such an
attitude. Yet, this Article will have the effect of pointing out that the
Civil Code was actually meant to be a safeguard.
II. Historical Perspective: The Civil Code as a Safeguard
The main purpose of the Code has been to unify the law of the
country. Its style shows that it was meant to be understood by the ordi-
16 Id. at 78. David compares the attitudes of the French and English lawyers with re-
spect to the conception of legal rules. Id. He then goes on to explain that to an English
lawyer, the French legal rule "does not have the precision that is the essence of such a rule.
Rather, it is a legal principle." Id
17 Mo NTsQuIEu, THE SPir OF THE LAws 156-67 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
Cambridge University Press 1989). Montesquieu, drawing from principles espoused byJohn
Locke, developed one of the cornerstone concepts of the American Consitution-separation
of powers. In his 1669 work, Fundamental Consitutionsfor the Government of Carolina, which was
written in Montesquieu's capacity as Secretary of the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, he set
forth the basic premises of the doctrine.
18 The term "jurisprudence" as used in this context should not be confused with juris-
prudence in the American and English sense of the term, which is more of a philosophical
concept.
19 See, e.g., BORIS STARCK, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT 342-48 (Henri Roland & Laurent
Boyer eds., 3d ed. 1991).
20 RODOLFO SACCO, LA COMPARAISON JURIDIQUE Au SERVICE DE LA CONNAISSANCE Du
DROIT 51-59 (1991) (illustrating how difficult it is for lawyers to reconcile the fact that behind
the authority of the State, the only lawmaker, many other forces are at work, such as judges
and law professors, that contribute to the creation of the law). See infra notes 64-87 and
accompanying text.
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nary citizen. Without denying a possible contribution by the judiciary,
the codifiers meant the Code to safeguard the citizens against any form
of judicial arbitrariness.
A. The Purpose of the Code: Unification of the Law of the Country
During the centuries following the rise of the French monarchy,
the French kings strove to unify the country. When Hughes Capet 21
was made king in 987, he only had direct jurisdiction over a very small
part of the kingdom, called the Domaine Royal. The Domaine Royal cov-
ered no more than a fifth of the country, mainly Paris and the "Ile de
France." Other provinces remained under the jurisdiction of very pow-
erful local lords who kept fighting for independence. It took the skills
and the efforts of kings like Charles VII (with the help ofJoan of Arc),
Louis XI, Francis I, Louis XIV, and Louis XV to impose a strong royal
power and the idea of a centralized State.
Yet, these kings never managed to impose a system of law on the
whole country. In France, unlike in England where a centralized sys-
tem of royal courts soon imposed a common law,22 the judicial power
was not in the hands of royal judges. Justice was chiefly local. The
local parlements23 were sovereign courts of justice in their provinces,
and the Parlement de Paris did not control parlements in Bordeaux, Tou-
louse, Aix-en-Provence, or Dijon.
The northern half of France remained a pays de coutume (a land of
customary law) with a mosaic of local customs, and the southern half a
pays de droit icrit (a land of written law) where the Roman law was
chiefly applied. A few major statutes (ordonnances royales) had been
promulgated during the reigns of Charles VII, Francis I, Louis XIII,
Louis XIV, and Louis XV. The statutes, however, only achieved unifi-
cation in some limited parts of the law, such as real estate, gifts, and
successions. 24 However, even this limited unification paved the way
and indicated that: (1) legislation was the only possible way to unify
the law of the country; and (2) sound unification implied an accepta-
ble compromise between customs and Roman law.
During the 18th century, under the influence of philosophers like
Voltaire and Rousseau, the French people came to realize that they
21 Capet was the founding king of the dynasty that ruled over the country for 800 years
until the time of the French Revolution in 1789. See FRANCOIS OLPMER-MARTIN, HISTOIRE Du
DROIT FRANCA.s DES ORIGINES A LA RIkVOLUTION (1948).
22 The term "common" refers to the fact that the law was common to the whole country.
23 This term should not to be confused with the English term parliament, which refers
to a governing legislative body.
24 By the Ordonnance de Montil-les-Tours of 1454, Charles VII ordained that the customs of
the various territories should be written down. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN Krz, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw 78 (1948). This task was never completed, but it helped in the
development of a common customary law of France (droit coutumier commun) without which
the attempt to unify the law through codification would probably have been in vain. Id. at
78-79.
1995]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
were one nation. As Voltaire said in his well-known ironic style, it was
absurd for a traveller to change law as often as he changed horses. 25
Legislation came to be seen as the mode of unifying the nation.2 6
In 1791, the Constituent Assembly (the first national assembly
during the Revolution) decided by a unanimous vote that a code
should be drafted.2 7 Yet, the turmoil of the Revolution did not favor
such a project. At the end of 1799, despite several votes, nothing had
been done in that respect.2 8 It took the genius of the first Consul,
Napoleon Bonaparte, to revive the spirit of the dying Revolution and
to fulfill the project of a code. On August 13, 1800, he appointed a
committee of four members to prepare the draft of a civil code which
would be discussed and voted on by the legislature. 29
The idea was not new. The royal ordinances of Louis XIV and
Louis XV had already been prepared by specialized committees of
prominent jurists. But the energy and the genius of Napoleon, who
took a strong interest and a personal part in the realization of the pro-
ject, made it possible to produce a comprehensive code within a very
short period of time: the whole code was enacted in 1804.30
The members of Napoleon's committee, four prominent jurists
(Tronchet, Bigot-Preameneu, Maleville, and Portalis), actually repre-
sented the two systems of customs and written law. Never did they
claim any intention to create a completely new system. They endeav-
ored to use all their knowledge, experience, and wisdom to effect a
smooth transition between the past and the present so that the Code
could be a dual compromise between the laws of the North (customs)
and the South (Roman law), and between the ideas of the past and the
revolutionary ideal.
While in exile, Napoleon said: "My true glory is not that I have
won 40 battles; Waterloo will blow away the memory of these victories.
What nothing can blow away, what will live eternally, is my Civil
Code."3 1 There is a certain degree of truth in this emphatic statement.
Since the time of the Revolution, France has had approximately fifteen
25 Voltaire once said: "Is it not an absurd and terrible thing that what is true in one
village is false in another? What kind of barbarism is it that citizens must live under different
laws? ... When you travel in this kingdom you change legal systems as often as you change
horses." Id. at 8.
26 See generally MONTESQUIEU, supra note 17. For a standard treatise covering the history
of French law before the French Revolution, see FRANcois OLIVIER-MARTIN, HISTOIRE DU
DROIT FRANCM~s DES ORIGINES A LA RIVOLUTION (1948). For a brief survey of this period, see
ZWEIGERT & K6Tz, supra note 24, at 76-86.
27 ZWEirERT & K6Tz, supra note 24, at 83 ("A code of civil law common to the whole
kingdom will be drawn up.").
28 On the law of the revolutionary period (known as droit intermddiaire), see id. at 82-86.
29 Id. at 84-86. See generallyJEAN-Louls HALPERIN, L'IMPOSSIBLE CODE CML (1992).
30 The various parts of the French Civil Code had been enacted by way of thirty-six
separate statutes during the years 1803 and 1804. The Code was re-enacted as a whole by the
Law of March 21, 1804.
31 Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REv. 762, 764 (1969).
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constitutions, but has always kept its Civil Code, which has been de-
scribed as the "civil constitution" of the country.3 2 Although it has
been amended many times, the structure and many portions remain
unchanged.
B. The Style of the Code: Legislating for the Ordinary Citizen
The style chosen by the drafters of the Code is an indication of
their intention to protect the citizen against the wrongful interference
of the judiciary. The drafters also intended it to be non-technical. It is
almost free of the legal jargon often used by professionals to establish
their authority and protect their power. Like the text of a constitution,
it is meant to be understood by ordinary citizens, without the interfer-
ence of verbose lawyers, who sometimes strive to make the law more
complicated than it really is.
Interestingly, it is not so in all the civil law countries. The German
Civil Code, known in German as the Bfirgeliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), is
by comparison a very technical text that only a professional lawyer can
understand. This is due to the fact that historically, the main authority
in German law was the professor. German law is based on a very so-
phisticated analysis of Roman law sources, chiefly the Pandects, by far
the most comprehensive part of Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis. Until
the time of Bismarck, there was not one Germany but a mosaic of small
States with their individual supreme courts.33 These supreme courts
used to refer to academic work in order to decide complicated cases.3 4
The BGB, which came into force on January 1, 1900, almost a
hundred years after the French Civil Code, is a pure product of the
work of scientists. 35 It is full of complicated terms and abstract con-
cepts. It contains a general part and some special parts, the latter to be
construed on the background of the general part, resulting in hun-
dreds of cross references.
This reference to the German experience is presented to show
that there is no single method for making civil codes. The French
method is more the product of history than legal science. 36 For all the
32 See supra text accompanying note 2.
33 Once the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nation had been abolished in 1806,
the German Supreme Court (the Reichskammergericht), which had been created in 1495,
ceased to exist. See Francis Dedk & Max Rheinstein, The Development of French and German Law,
24 GEO. L.J. 551, 568-70 (1936).
34 This tradition dated back to the Middle Ages, when judges used to refer to the "com-
mon opinion of doctors" (opinio communis doctorum). See generally Helmut Coing, The Roman
Law as lus Commune on the Continent, 89 L.Q. REv. 505 (1973) (discussing the influence of
legal education during the Middle Ages in spreading Roman legal concepts throughout con-
tinental Europe). For a general survey of the historical development of German law, see
ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 24, at 133-43. See also Deik & Rheinstein, supra note 33, at 568-
70.
35 See ZWEIGERT & K6-rz, supra note 24, at 150-51.
36 It has been retained or imitated inter alia in Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain,
Louisiana, Quebec, and most Latin American countries. Id. at 100-22. On the other hand,
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reasons given, it retains the distinctive character of being a safeguard, a
"civil constitution" of the country. Its style makes it more comparable
to the American Constitution than to any U.S. statute.
It is worth noting that when the French Parliament introduces
amendments into the Civil Code, it tries to preserve the Code's origi-
nal architecture and to draft the new provisions in the same, simple
style. If the new provisions are long and technical, then, despite the
fact that they refer to questions dealt with in the Code, they are placed
instead in auxiliary statutes. The Law of 1978 on consumer credit
agreements,3 7 the Law of 1985 on road traffic accidents,38 or the De-
cree of 1955 relating to land registration3 9 are a few examples of such
auxiliary statutes. These auxiliary statutes, like the mass of French leg-
islation enacted during the second half of this century, 40 are often as
technical and detailed as American legislation.
C. The Paradox of the Code: Trust or Distrust of the Judiciary?
Of course, as indicated above, the judge can play a more creative
role when applying the Civil Code than when construing these obscure
statutes. In fact, the Code's draftsmen intended judges to play just
such a role. For example, Portalis, the most prominent of the four
drafters, was a political moderate, a fact made clear in the preliminary
speech he delivered to the Assembly charged with enacting the
Code. 41 Portalis explained the two extremes that legislators should
avoid: oversimplification-"leaving citizens without rule or guarantee
concerning their greatest interests"42 -and going too far into details-
keeping "clear of the dangerous ambition of wanting to forecast and
regulate everything."43 Indeed, "society's needs are so varied, the in-
tercourse between them so active, their interests so manifold, and their
relations so extensive that the legislator cannot possibly provide for all
eventualities." 44
Extremely detailed rules, it was thought, could not resist evolution
the German model has been imported in Greece, the former Soviet Union, Hungary, and
some other Eastern European countries. Id. at 159-60. Yet, many countries like Italy, Switzer-
land, and Austria are greatly influenced by German scholarship. Id. at 153.
37 C. civ. art. 1914 (94th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying L. No. 78-22 of
Jan. 10, 1978).
38 C. crv. art. 1384 (94th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying L. No. 85-677 of
July 5, 1985).
39 C. civ. art. 2203 (94th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying D. No. 55-22 of
Jan. 4, 1954).
40 These statutes are often consolidated in some very technical codes like the CODE
GtNtRAL DES IMP6TS (Dalloz 1993) (Taxation Code), CODE DE LA StCURrrT SOCIALE (Dalloz
1994) (Social Security Code), CODE DE L'URBANISME (Dalloz 1994) (Town Planning Code).
41 M. Schael Herman, Excerpts From A Discourse On the Code Napoleon By Portalis And Case
Law And Doctrine By A. Esmrin, 18 Loy. L. Rxv. 23, 24-28 (1972). See Levasseur, supra note 31,
at 767-74 (citing excerpts translated by M. Shael Herman).
42 Levasseur, supra note 31, at 769.
43 Id.
44 Id.
[VOL. 20
THE FRENCH CML CODE
and would have to be amended too often, which creates insecurity.
According to Portalis, this is not what legislation ought to be:
The role of legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach, the gen-
eral propositions of the law, to establish principles which will be fertile
in application, and not to get down to the details of questions which
may arise in particular instances. It is for the judge and the jurist,
imbued with the general spirit of the laws, to direct their
application.
45
Turning to the method of interpretation, Portalis made a clear
distinction between the task of judges from that of legislators.
When the legislation is clear, it must be followed; when it is obscure,
we must carefully analyze its provisions. If there is no particular enact-
ment, custom or equity must be consulted. Equity is the return to
natural law, when positive laws are silent, contradictory, or obscure
46
Then, he made this magnificent statement:
There is a science for lawmakers, as there is for judges; and the former
does not resemble the latter. The legislator's science consists in find-
ing in each subject the principles most favorable to the common good;
the judge's science is to put these principles into effect, to diversify
them, and to extend them, by means of wise and reasoned application,
to private causes; to examine closely the spirit of the law when the
letter kills.
4 7
He concluded on the value of experience: "It is for experience gradu-
ally to fill up the gaps we leave." 48
It was therefore admitted thatjudges may contribute to the evolu-
tion of the law by way of judicial interpretation. The judge is meant to
complement and update the work of the legislator. But the text is
there, general but clear. It cannot easily be distorted, and it is there-
fore a good safeguard.
The conception advocated by Portalis implied a certain degree of
trust placed in the ability of the judiciary. The judicial reforms under-
taken during the Revolutionary and Imperial periods justify such an
optimistic view. A centralized court system had been created, with a
supreme court at the top, the Cour de cassation, something France never
had before. And officially at least, judicial appointments were made
regardless of social and feudal privileges.
Yet, the French have never totally lost their prejudice towards the
judicial system, which they regarded, rightly, as subservient to an all
powerful executive. They have always been apprehensive that judicial
power might be abused. This fear, no doubt, arises from the judicial
abuses inflicted on the French people under the Ancien Regime. Even
today, French judges still enjoy little prestige or esteem. They are eas-
45 Id.
46 Id. at 771.
47 Id. at 772.
48 Id. at 773.
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ily criticized both by the population and by politicians. They are noth-
ing but a special category of civil servants.
Prior to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which was enacted
on October 6, 1958, there was no judicial review of legislative power.
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic created a Constitutional Court
with very limited jurisdiction.49 Yet, when the French constitutional
judges have attempted to develop a check on the exercise of legislative
power,50 their attempts are denounced as leading to potential govern-
ment by judges.51
As a matter of fact, the French Constitution of 1958 prefers the
term autoritijudiciaire ('Judicial authority") to that of pouvoirjudiciare
('judicial power"). 52 The latter term would parallel the American
terms legislative power and executive power. The word "authority" was
meant to be weaker than the term "power."53
For these reasons, despite the important powers vested in them,
judges have kept a low profile. During the 19th century, French judges
claimed to do an exegesis of the Code or, in other words, they inter-
preted the Code strictly. Exegesis as a technique of interpretation has
often been described in France as being a servile and literal interpreta-
tion. This is not exactly true. Some brilliant comparatists 54 and at
least one French scholar55 have provided evidence of the creative work
made by the so-called "Exegetical School" in the 19th Century.
49 FR. CONST. arts. 56-63. When a statute has been passed, certain representatives of the
executive or the legislative branch may, before the promulgation of the statute, challenge its
constitutionality before the Conseil constitutionneL When held to be unconstitutional, the stat-
ute is ineffective and cannot be promulgated. However, if no timely submission to the Conseil
constitutionnel is made, the statute is promulgated and its constitutionality cannot be ques-
tioned by anyone before any court.
50 For an authoritative survey of this evolution leading to a more developed system of
judicial review, see Louis Favoreu, Le contrile de constitutionnaliti des normes juridiques par le
Conseil constitutionnel, 1987 REVUE FRANAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF [R. FR. D. ADMIN.] 845.
51 In July and August 1993, the Conseil constitutionnel was called upon to review six im-
portant statutes designed to enforce the newly appointed Balladur Government law and or-
der policy. On August 13, 1993, the Conseil constitutionnel held that some provisions of a
statute imposing a strict control of immigration were unconstitutional. The next day, Mr.
Charles Pasqua, the Minister of the Interior, declared on the television channel TF 1: "The
Conseil constitutionnel more and more rules according to expediency than according to the
great republican principles. As everyone may notice, there is a real drift. Yet, sovereignty
belongs to the people." Michel DeJaeghere, Minoriti de blocage, 378 LE SPECTACLE DO MONDE
10 (1993) (a press article presenting the conservative opinion that judges should not be
allowed to challenge the government policy once accepted by the representative of the
people).
Edouard Lambert, who in 1921 founded the Institute of Comparative Law at the Univer-
sity of Lyon, expressed critical views of the U.S. Supreme Court's anti-progressive govern-
ment by judges. See generally EDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LuTTE
CONTRE LA LtGISLATION SOCIALE Aux ETATS-UNIS. L'ExPERIENCE AMtIRICAINE DU CONTR6LE
JUDICPAIRE DE LA CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES Lois (1921).
52 FR. CONST. art. 64.
53 See PHILIPPE ARDANT, INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET DRorr CONSTITUTIONNEL 586
(1991).
54 See generally JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1978).
55 Philippe Rbmy, Eloge de lexiogse, REVUE DE LA RECHERCHEJURIDIQUE DROIT PROSPECrIF
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The judges' work may look conservative, since they referred to
some old historical sources such as the coutume de Paris, royal ordi-
nances, Roman law, texts of Domat,56 or Pothier (whose works influ-
enced the drafters a great deal).57 Yet, they also knew how to promote
a sound evolution, considering the law as a system and working on the
assumption that the Code declares rather than creates the law.58
During this period, judges had to keep a low profile and to act as
if everything they said naturally flowed from the provisions of the
Code, as if they were merely giving effect to the legislators' intention.
The fact that French judicial decisions contain no individual opinions,
but are a brief summary of the majority opinion, with virtually no refer-
ence to the arguments presented, greatly assisted judges in maintain-
ing the fiction that they were merely following the Code. It is enough
for the court of highest jurisdiction to state: "According to article 1384
paragraph 1, the law is thus." Such a statement gives everyone the im-
pression that the solution is at least dwelling implicitly in the Code
provision. Such statements also made the shift to a more daring atti-
tude possible.
II. Modern Developments: The Civil Code as an Alibi
At the turn of the century, judges did much more than simply
keep alive the Code they revered. In order to circumvent some obso-
lete rules and modernize the law, they did not hesitate to depart from
the obvious intention of the legislator and move away from traditional
principles supporting some Code provisions. Nonetheless, they kept
paying lip service to the Code, citing its provisions as the direct source
of their judgments. Such a use of provisions of the Code may be de-
scribed as "legal fiction." Yet, in the present context, the word "alibi"
has been preferred: When accused of departure from the text, the
judge can answer that he did not commit the crime of acting as a legis-
lator 59 but remained within the framework of the provision which was
cited.
A study of the development of the law of tort is particularly illus-
trative. The law of tort is contained in five Articles of the Code, 1382
254 (1982). The best key towards the understanding of the law of that time is found in
CHRISTIAN ATlAS, EPISTtSMOLOGIE JUIDIQUE 21, 47 (1985).
56 LEs Lois CIVILFs DANs LEUR ORDRE NATUREL (1689-1694).
57 Pothier's famous TRAIT DES OBLIGATIONS (1761) was translated into English by W.D.
Evans in 1806.
58 R~my, supra note 55, at 259-62.
59 Article 5 of the Civil Code states that "judges are forbidden, when giving judgement
in the cases which are brought before them, to lay down general rules of conduct. . . ." C.
crv. art. 5 (Fr.). Ajudge who violated this prohibition was guilty of a criminal offense. CODE
PENAL [C. PtN.] art. 127 (Fr.) (repealed by the new Penal Code which came into force on
April 1, 1994). Article 5 was intended to prevent judges from returning to the old practice of
making arrmits de r~glement, i.e., stating in ajudgment a general rule to be applied in forthcom-
ing cases.
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to 1386. As already stated, Article 1382, which is the first and principle
Article of the Code relating to tort, is couched in very general terms.60
This part of the Code is inspired, not by the pragmatism of the Roman
lawyers but by the ideals of the 18th century philosophers, basing liabil-
ity in tort on the principle of moral responsibility. According to the
Civil Code, apart from a few exceptional cases where negligence was
presumed, liability in tort was clearly based on the idea of fault. Evi-
dence had to be adduced that the damage had been caused by some
form of negligence. 61
With the development of industrial machinery, and the advent of
the railroad and the internal combustion engine, principles underly-
ing the law relating to third-party liability became obsolete. For in-
stance, was it reasonable to ask the worker/victim of a workplace
accident caused by a defective machine to prove, in order to recover
damages, that the accident had been caused by some fault or negli-
gence of the employer? Was it fair to deny any remedy to the victim of
a road traffic accident who had been behaving carefully but had not
managed to convince a court that the driver had been negligent? Who
was to bear the risk of such casualties: the innocent victim or the one
who, by using the machine, had created the risk?
Two solutions were possible. The first possibility was to ask the
legislator to intervene, but there was too much controversy surround-
ing this option and the French legislators remained stubbornly pas-
sive. 62 The second solution wasjudicial, and, thanks to the creativity of
the French judiciary-assisted of course by imaginative academics-
the legislature was allowed to sleep until 1985.63 In the meantime
some judicial solutions had been found in the law of contract and the
law of tort.
A. Alibis in the Law of Contract
In modernizing personal injury law, the courts relied on the law of
contract whenever possible. If there was a contract of carriage between
the victim and the carrier, the contract was said to include an implied
60 C. civ. art. 1382 (Fr.); see supra note 5.
61 C. civ. arts. 1382-1383 (Fr.).
62 There were a few exceptions to this passivity such as the Law of April 9, 1898, which
provided compensation for workers who were victims of accidents suffered during the course
of their employment. This statute has been replaced by the Law of October 30, 1946, CODE
DE LA SECURITt SOClALE art. L. 414 (Fr.), which provides for automatic but limited compensa-
tion, without any need to prove the employer's negligence.
63 In 1985, the National Assembly passed special legislation on road traffic accidents
which provided for a scheme of automatic compensation. C. clv. art. 1384 (94th ed. Petits
Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying L. No. 85-677 of July 5, 1985). The provisions of this
auxiliary statute are far more detailed than that of the proposed law of December 5, 1906,
which purported to revise the text of C. civ. art. 1386 by adding two paragraphs. See ARTHUR
T. VON MEHREN &JAMES R. GoRDLEY, THE CMvIL LAw SYSTEM 625 (2d ed. 1977).
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obligation to carry the person safely (obligation de sicurite).64 In the
case of railroad transportation, the courts hesitated in deciding the
scope of this application. It could start when the passenger entered
the railroad station to buy his ticket, or when he eventually bought his
ticket, and it would finish once he had left the station at the point of
arrival. It could even be limited to only exist during the actual act of
transportation. Yet, even if it was fair to hold the carrier prima facie
liable in the case of a crash, it was too much to hold him liable for
breach of the safety obligation when the traveller had missed a step
when boarding the train.
Working on a distinction invented by a law professor, 65 the con-
tractual obligation could be of two kinds. The first type of contractual
obligation was an obligation de risultat, which can be described as the
standard obligation to perform what is actually promised in the con-
tract, in which case nonperformance gives a right to damages without
need to prove negligence. The second type of contractual obligation
was an obligation de prudence et diligence, also known as an obligation de
moyens.66 In this type of obligation, the promisor only undertakes a
duty of due care but is under no obligation to reach any particular
outcome. The aggrieved promisee has to prove negligence if he wants
to obtain damages. This second type of obligation is typically the one
found by judges in contracts between medical practitioners and their
patients. The victim of medical malpractice has a contractual action
but must prove negligence. The physician has a contractual duty to act
with reasonable care according to the present state of scientific knowl-
edge, but is under no duty to heal the patient.67
Returning to railroad accidents, the courts ruled that the carrier's
obligation to carry the person safely was an obligation de risultat begin-
ning when the passenger boarded the train and ending when he had
stepped off.68 When the accident happened inside the station, for in-
stance on the platform, the carrier still owed a contractual obligation,
which was analyzed as an obligation de moyens. The victim therefore had
to prove the carrier's negligence. 69
To avoid blurred distinctions as to the moment when the contrac-
tual obligation was incurred, the courts eventually ruled that when the
accident happened outside the scope of the contractual obligation de
64 Judgment of Nov. 21, 1911 (Compagnie g~n~rale transatlantique), Cass. civ., 1913
Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 1 249 note L. Sarrut (Fr.).
65 RENt DEMOGUE, 5 TRArrt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GNtRAL § 1237 (1925).
66 Id. For a detailed study, see generally JOSEPH FROSSARD, DE LA DISTINCTION DES OBLI-
GATIONS DE MOYENS ET DES OBLIGATIONS DE RksULTAT (1965).
67 Judgment of May 20, 1936, Cass. civ., 1936 Recueil Dalloz [D.P. I] I 88 rapport
Josserand, Concl. Matter, note E.P (Fr.).
68 Judgment of July 1, 1969, Cass. civ. Ire, 1969 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 640 note
G.C.M. (Fr.).
69 Judgment of July 21, 1970, Cass. civ. Ire, 1970 Recueil Dalloz [D.Jur.] 767 note R.
Abadir (Fr.).
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risultat, for instance on the platform, before boarding the train, or af-
ter having stepped off, the carrier's liability was in tort. This was the
case even if the passenger had already purchased his ticket.70 The con-
tractual obligation de moyens in rail transportation therefore can no
longer apply.
This evolution in the law is entirely judicial. The distinction be-
tween obligation de risultat and obligation de moyens does not appear in
the Code. The Cour de cassation, the court of last resort in the French
system, had to find some legislative support for the distinction. The
effort was necessary in order for the Court to be able to determine
whether, in the given circumstances, the court below had rightly de-
cided that this obligation was an obligation de risultat or an obligation de
moyens.
It was easy to justify the obligation de risultat, which is the typical
contractual obligation. The court can resort to Article 1147, which
provides:
The debtor is condemned, where this is appropriate, to the payment
of damages, whether for the non-performance of the obligation or for
delay in its performance, whenever he does not show that the non-
performance results from an extraneous event which cannot be im-
puted to him, even though there is no bad faith on his part. 71
This is a general provision of the Code covering any contractual obliga-
tion, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
The legal alibi for the obligation de moyens was found in Article
1137. According to this Article, the obligation of looking after a thing
one has been entrusted with requires the person so obliged to exercise
the care of a "good family father" (bon pre defamille or bonus paterfamil-
ias).72 Through a curious analogy, travellers and medical patients are
to be treated as well as things entrusted to bailees.
No French jurists would question this distinction, since it is sup-
ported by two articles in the Code. Its academic origin does not ap-
pear in any judgment. Indeed, French courts only cite statutes. The
Cour de cassation never makes any express reference to cases or to legal
writing. Most inferior courts do likewise. French scholars are trained
to accept this practice 73 and legal insiders will be able to trace the aca-
demic origin of the new theories upheld by the courts anyway.74 How-
70 Judgment of Mar. 7, 1989 (Valverde v. S.N.C.F.), Cass. civ. Ire, 1991 Recueil Dalloz
[D. Jur.] I note Ph. Malaurie (Fr.).
71 C. civ. art. 1147 (Fr.).
72 C. crv. art. 1137 (Fr.). This is a standard inherited from Roman law; it is the
equivalent to the reasonable person in common law countries.
7s The practice is radically different in Germany where books are commonly cited in
judgments rendered by the courts of highest jurisdiction.
74 French legal periodicals such as REcUEIL DALLOZ-SIREY, LA SEmAiNE JuIOIQUE, LA
GAZETTE DU PALAxs, usually publish judgments accompanied by a note or comment written by
a law professor, a judge, or a practicing attorney. These notes provide interesting details
which cannot be found in the very short majority opinion. They refer to the non-legislative
sources which do not appear in the court decision. Important Cour de cassation decisions are
[VOL.. 20
THE FRENCH CIVL CODE
ever, any rule of law applied by a court, regardless of whether it is
actually of academic origins, has to be presented as if it followed logi-
cally from a legislative text.
B. Alibis in the Law of Tort
When no contract exists between the victim and the defendant, a
solution had to be found in the law of torts. As indicated above, the
Code based liability on fault, which includes lack of care and negli-
gence. 75 This is a general rule, to which the Code makes few excep-
tions, the whole law of torts being contained in no more than five
articles. 76
Article 1384 paragraph 1 provides: "A person is liable not only for
the damage he causes by his own act, but also for that caused by the
acts of a person for whom he is responsible or by things that he has
under his guard."77 This provision was designed to cover situations of
vicarious liability: of employers for torts committed by their employ-
ees,78 parents' liability for their children, 79 and the presumption that
damage caused by an animal80 or by the collapse of a building81 is due
to the negligence of its owner.
Gradually, the Cour de cassation came to hold, on the basis of Arti-
cle 1384 paragraph 1, that the guardian of a thing of any kind, not only
animals or buildings, is prima facie answerable for any damage caused
by the thing.8 2 Such strict liability may be pleaded not only when the
damage comes from the thing itself (e.g., the explosion of a boiler)8 3
but also when the thing is manipulated by a person (e.g., an accident
caused by a car in motion).84 The guardian, who was said by the Cour
de cassation to be the person having the use, control, and direction of
the thing,8 5 can only be exonerated by proving force majeure (i.e., that
often published together with the report prepared by one of the three or five (or sometimes
more) judges who have heard the case and/or with the comments made by the State Attor-
ney (Procureur gginral or Avocat ginirat).
75 C. civ. arts. 1382-1383 (Fr.).
76 See C. clv. arts. 1382-1386 (Fr.).
77 C. civ. art. 1384 para. 1 (Fr.).
78 C. civ. art. 1384 para. 5 (Fr.).
79 C. crv. art. 1384 para. 4 (Fr.).
80 C. clv. art. 1385 (Fr.).
81 C. crv. art. 1386 (Fr.).
82 Judgment ofJan. 21, 1919 (Chemin de I'Ouest v. Marcault), Cass. civ., 1922 Recueil
Dalloz [D.Jur.] 1 25 note G. Ripert (Fr.). See VON MEHREN & GoRDLEY, supra note 63, at 555-
702, which includes a translation of some of the cases and materials discussed in this section.
For a comprehensive discussion, see E.A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act of
Things: A Study of Judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. Rv. 1299 (1988).
83 Id.
84 Judgment of Feb. 13, 1930 (Jand'heur v. Les Galeries belfortaises), Cass. ch. r6un.,
1930 Recueil Dalloz [D.Jur.] 1 57 note G. Ripert (Fr.).
85 In a famous case where the automobile that caused the damage had been stolen, the
Cour de cassation held that the owner nonetheless retained the guard of it. Judgment of Mar.
3, 1936 (Connot v. Franck), Cass. civ., 1936 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 1 81 note R. Capitant
(Fr.). The case was remanded to a Court of Appeal that refused to hold the owner liable.
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the damage was caused by an irresistible, unforeseeable outside event)
or the contributory negligence of the victim.8 6
Many other refined distinctions have been developed, with no
more legal support than Article 1384 paragraph 1. For instance, the
Cour de cassation paid lip service to Article 1384 in deciding a case deal-
ing with a building damaged by fire caused by the explosion of a televi-
sion set. In that situation, the Court held the manufacturer and not
the owner of the set liable, reasoning that it was the manufacturer who
guards the structure of the appliance. On the other hand, if the dam-
age was caused by a wrong use of the television set, the courts would
decide that the user is liable, because he has the "guard of the behav-
ior" (garde du comportement) of the thing that caused the damage. Once
again the Code provision providing the alibi for either rule is Article
1384.87
These interpretations are not necessarily wrong. They usually lead
to a fair result. These examples are intended to show that French
judges are lawmakers and that the French Cour de cassation creates
precedents, even if such precedents only have persuasive authority.
But for the reasons set forth above, law making has to be done with an
alibi of some Code provisions.
IV. Conclusion: Judges Can Go "Beyond the Code but Through
the Code"
To justify such departures from the often obvious intention of the
legislature, academics came to say that one had moved to a modern
The Plenary Assembly of the Cour de cassation had to enter a final decision and this time held
that the guardian was the thief and not the owner, because the latter had lost control of it
and the former now had the use, the control, and the direction of the thing. Judgment of
Dec. 2, 1941 (Franck v. Connot), Cass. ch. r6un., 1942 Recueil Dalloz [D.C. Jur.] 25 note G.
Ripert (Fr.).
86 The contributory negligence of the victim totally or partially exonerated the guard-
ian of the thing. Judgment of Sept. 9, 1940, Cass. civ., 1940 Recueil Dalloz [D.H. Jur.] 141
(Fr.). Yet, in the Judgment ofJuly 21, 1982 (Desmares), Cass. civ. 26me, 1982 Recueil Dalloz
[D. jur.] 449 concl. Charbonnier and note Ch. Larroumet (Fr.), the Cour de cassation held
that the victim's fault could only exonerate the guardian when the result was unforeseeable
and insuperable. This theory, extending the protection of the victims of road traffic acci-
dents, was strongly criticized. It was abandoned in 1987, after the enactment of the Law No.
85-677 ofJuly 22, 1985, which created a system of automatic compensation for victims of car
accidents. Judgment of Apr. 6, 1987 (Chauvet and Mettetal), Cass. civ. 26me, 1988 Recueil
Dalloz [D. Jur.] 32 note Ch. Mouly (Fr.). The Cour de cassation then decided to move back to
the former theory. Id.
87 Judgment of Nov. 30, 1988, Cass. civ. 3e, 1988 Bull. Civ. II, No. 240. Inspired by Paul
Roubier, the distinction has been created by Berthold Golman in his work DE LA DtTERMINA-
TION DU GARDIEN RESPONSABLE Du FAIT DES CHOSES INANIMtES (1947). See also Andre Tune,
Garde du Comportement et garde de la Structure dans la Responsabilitd du Fait des Chases Inanimies,
1957J.C.P. I, No. 1384.
The distinction was first rejected by the Cour de cassation. Judgment of June 11, 1953,
Cass. civ. 2e, 1954 Recueil Dalloz [D.Jur.] 21 note R. Rodi(re (Fr.). However, the distinction
was later upheld. Judgment ofNov. 12, 1975, Cass. civ. Ire, 1976J.C.P. II, No. 18479 note G.
Viney (Fr.) (explosion of a bottle of aerated water).
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method of interpretation.88 When a provision is recent, the judge has
to explain it and look for the legislative intention, wherever he may
find it. He applies the exegetical method in its traditional sense. Yet,
when the problem is new and the law was enacted at a time when the
problem could not be anticipated, the judge is free to take into ac-
count equity and policy elements and to act as a legislator. Still, he
must keep within the framework of the Code.
At the beginning of the century, Saleilles put forth the magic
formula "au deld du Code civil, mais par le Code civil": One has to go
beyond the Code, but through the Code. 89 To that extent, French
lawyers are expert magicians.90 This phrase actually points out the
great paradox of the French attitude. The legislators should create all
rules, and the powers of the courts, which are considered untrustwor-
thy, should be limited. Nevertheless, clear general rules continue to be
preferred to detailed enactments, at least in matters covered by the
Civil Code. So, let us allow the Cour de cassation to complement the
legislative work, provided that they conceal the purely doctrinal91 or
judicial origin of the rules they create and disguise it under the alibi of
some general Code provision. They can find great support for such
actions in the old tradition of stating the law in judgments shorter than
the headnote of a common law decision.
88 FRANcois GkNy, METHODES D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt POSITIF, Es-
SAI CRITIQUE (1899).
89 Raymond Saleilles, Preface to FRANCOIS G.Ny, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DRorr PRlvt
PosITIF (1913).
90 Or legal priests of the next world, "Au-del" meaning, when used substantively, the
"hereafter." Saleilles, at the end of his Preface, insisted on the importance of the term "Au-
de"" saying that it should become the watchword of all jurists. Id.
91 In French law, the word doctrine is used in the sense of legal writing.
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